The price is right? : Has the financial crisis provided a fatal blow to the efficient market hypothesis? by Renee Courtois
B
usiness cycle fluctuations are costly, but they do
come with a small upside for economists: They serve
as a way to test how well prevailing economic 
theories hold up to reality. 
The recent recession is no different. Some have suggest-
ed that the long-standing “efficient market hypothesis”
(EMH) has been disproved once and for all by the financial
crisis. The EMH says that financial market participants act
as powerful information gatherers about an asset’s “true”
value, such that an asset’s price will generally reflect all infor-
mation available about that asset. 
But if financial markets are efficient, critics argue, how
could investors have gotten things so wrong as far as housing
and securitization markets are concerned? Housing prices
soared, and securities backed by risky subprime mortgages
were sold throughout the financial system at prices that, as
now seems apparent, didn’t reflect their true risk. “In short,
the belief in efficient financial markets blinded many, if not
most, economists to the emergence of the biggest financial
bubble in history. And efficient-market theory also played a
significant role in inflating that bubble in the first place,”
wrote Nobel laureate Paul Krugman in a September 2009
article in the New York Times Magazine.
Krugman’s concerns represent one side of the divide over
the EMH. The theory extends back to the birth of modern
finance. Before the 1950s, the world had few workable mod-
els for how asset prices are determined, but this changed
with the advent of computers. Statisticians began to study
stock market prices, an obvious area in which to apply their
new high-powered tools because the daily activity of stock
markets provides exceptionally abundant data.
The EMH emerged from this research. Economist
Eugene Fama first formalized the theory in his 1964 eco-
nomics Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Chicago —
although the hypothesis was intuited by some scholars long
before economics itself became a discipline. The basis for
the theory is the self-interest of investors: Because they
want to earn a profit, investors will work fervently to expose
and trade on even the tiniest bit of new information relevant
to an asset’s intrinsic value, leaving no available information
left unexploited. This means if there is something knowable
about an asset, it will quickly be reflected in its price. The
more frequently trading activity takes place within a market
— stock markets, for example, enjoy nearly constant price
discovery through daily trading activity — the more likely
the asset’s price is to reflect everything there is to know
about its true risk and economic prospects.
Fama’s famous 1970 paper, “Efficient Capital Markets: A
Review of Empirical Work,” helped set off the 1970s as the
growth period of the EMH’s development. Economists
showed how equity prices reflected information about 
economic fundamentals (like corporate earnings or, on the
macroeconomic level, interest rates and consumption) con-
sistent with the “rational expectations” paradigm that was
beginning to dominate economic research at that time. 
Efficiencies and Anomalies
Most of the early research found that stock markets do tend
to meet a certain degree of efficiency. Fama’s 1970 work
focused the EMH literature by defining possible degrees of
market efficiency. In general, where the costs to markets 
of gathering information exceed the benefits of trading 
on it, a market will be inefficient in the sense that it will 
not reflect that information. This is largely why “strong
form” efficiency — a market so efficient that an asset’s price
even reflects private information held by CEOs and 
other insiders — is broadly acknowledged as being highly
unrealistic. 
However, in a “semi-strong” efficient market, stock
prices reflect all information that is publicly available (think
price histories, publicly available accounting reports, and
other corporate announcements). A semi-strong efficient
market would require significant skill on the part of traders
to analyze and interpret information. The early research on
market efficiency generally suggested that stock markets
met this threshold. For instance, data indicated that
investors were unlikely to “beat” the market as a whole and
were better off putting their money in index funds that pur-
chase the entire market rather than managed funds or
individual stocks.
But by the mid-1980s, economists had increasingly
uncovered “anomalies,” occurrences in which financial mar-
kets appeared to act in a way that was contrary to the EMH.
Some economists found statistically important amounts of
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 predictability in stock prices. These can be exploited by sim-
ple trading strategies, which should not be possible in an
efficient market that exhausts all profit opportunities. One
of the most enduring anomalies is the idea of stock price
momentum: that the same stocks which are doing well for a
several-month period tend to be the same ones doing well
over the next several months. The converse appears to be
true for underperforming stocks. This pattern, too, is pre-
dictable. These anomalies cast doubt on the idea that a
stock’s price reflects all relevant and available information. 
Why would markets leave information on the table with
profit opportunities unexploited? Explaining this was a ripe
area for research. “There are a number of psychologists and
behavioral economists who started coming up with counter
examples to standard efficient markets results,” recalls econ-
omist Andrew Lo of M.I.T., who contributed to the early
research on anomalies. “Things like loss aversion, herding
behavior, mental accounting, probability matching. These
are experimental results where they would take test subjects
and give them various different kinds of gambles and these
individuals would behave in a manner that was not consis-
tent with efficient markets.” 
A key example is the phenomenon first documented by
Harvard economist David Laibson: that people follow the
path of least resistance when choosing whether to invest in
their 401Ks. If enrollment is voluntary, they tend not to do
it. But if enrollment is compulsory and opting out requires
an extra step, they tend to stay invested. That is, people
appear to irrationally make investment decisions based on
factors other than their expected financial gains. By the mid-
1980s, the field of behavioral finance had fully emerged,
applying psychology to financial markets to understand how
and why investors might sometimes make irrational trading
decisions.
It’s not investor irrationality that is at odds with the
EMH, just that irrationality can easily bleed into asset
prices. Savvy investors have incentive to identify and trade
against investors who are ignoring fundamentals, driving
asset prices back to rational levels. Under the EMH, “it’s the
smart money that matters,” Lo explains. “Some people are
crazy all the time, and all the people are crazy some of the
time, but the smart money will
drive out all these behavioral
anomalies.” 
Indeed, behavioral economics
has had a hard time turning docu-
mented anomalies and instances
of irrationality into models that
consistently explain movements
in stock prices. Many anomalies
disappear once you try to pin
them down with a model. Since
bouts of irrationality seem to
exhibit themselves randomly in
stock markets, they’re hard to
predict — which, of course, is
exactly what the EMH says about stock prices: You can’t
consistently predict them.
Behavioral economists aren’t dismayed by this, however,
since there’s nothing in psychology that suggests people
should under- or overreact in any consistentmanner. “Of course,
we do not expect [behavioral] research to provide a method to
make a lot of money off of financial market inefficiency very
fast and reliably,” wrote Robert Shiller, one of the most promi-
nent EMH critics, in a 2003 paper. “We should not expect
market efficiency to be so egregiously wrong that immediate
profits should be continually available.” 
Fama takes that as a small victory. He says behavioral
economists have good evidence that people are sometimes
systematically irrational. “All that stuff I think is great. The
work that they do is really good in describing the kinds 
of biases that people have, and how it shows up in their
behavior.” But to argue that irrationality can be systematic
enough to make prices predictable is something else, he says.
“Most of them don’t even make that jump. They don’t think
people can take advantage of whatever inefficiencies are
there. And my opinion is, they’re basically conceding that
for all practical purposes, markets are efficient.” In the
absence of an alternative model for how asset prices might
deviate from intrinsic values, much economic research
implicitly assumes the EMH holds by using stock prices 
as a proxy for a firm’s or market’s true value.
The Bubble Debate
Even though assuming market efficiency is the dominant way
of modeling asset prices, the debate still looms over whether
this holds true for the economy as a whole — and no such
debate is more alive than the one over the nature of asset bub-
bles. “[M]arket efficiency can be egregiously wrong in other
senses,” Shiller continued in 2003. “For example, efficient
markets theory may lead to drastically incorrect interpreta-
tions of events such as major stock market bubbles.”
Many economists have agreed that the recent run-up in
housing prices was, in retrospect, unjustified by economic
fundamentals — the common definition of an asset price
bubble. One possible explanation from the behavioral camp
is herd behavior, in which some financial market partici-
pants mimicked the actions of
others. 
The fact that everyone every-
where seemed to be profiting from
the housing and securitization mar-
kets may have validated to both
homeowners and investors the
belief that house prices would 
continue to rise indefinitely. 
Herd behavior could have led 
both groups to dismiss the risks
associated with mortgage and secu-
ritization markets and invest in
them beyond the degree that fun-
damentals — such as their incomes, i
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would justify. (It should be noted that herd behavior is often 
witnessed in sell-offs too. “The fight and flight response has
been very well documented as being a rather ancient part of
our neurophysiology. All of us are hardwired with a very sim-
ple set of reactions to fearful events. If you smell smoke and
you see a big fire in the room next to you, you will get scared
and you will run as quickly as you can,” says Lo. “If you’re on
the floor of the New York Stock Exchange and you just lost
20 percent of your wealth, you’re going to get scared and
you’re going to want to run like hell, but that’s not really
going to help your financial wealth.”)
But there can also be rational explanations for bubbles
that are perfectly consistent with the EMH. The EMH says
that investors’ financial decisions at a given time reflect their
perception of economic fundamentals. Yet there is nothing
in the EMH that says those perceptions are always correct.
To the extent that information about an asset is not widely
available or is costly to obtain and interpret, investors will
form expectations absent that information. It could also be
the case that investors fully suspect asset prices are inflated,
but believe they can “ride” the boom a bit longer, causing
them to rationally buy in. People’s perceptions also can be
affected by policy: If people believe unsuccessful risks will be
bailed out by government, then they will rationally take on
more risk than fundamentals alone would justify. Short of
being inside investors’ heads, rational bubbles are very diffi-
cult to distinguish from irrational bubbles.
The EMH says “that all the information that we have is
reflected in prices,” Lo summarizes. “EMH critics might say
that’s not true, because the very great risks were not in prices.
But, again, an efficient markets type would say, ‘Well, maybe
back then we didn’t have that information. Maybe back then
we didn’t fully appreciate just how dangerous some of the
toxic assets were. And so at that point in time, the best avail-
able information was incorporated into prices.’”
Both arguments may be right, according to Lo, but both
also misconstrue the concept of market efficiency: It is an
ideal, not something that either is or isn’t true. “It’s not that
the EMH is wrong, it’s that it doesn’t always work. Markets
are not always efficient all the time. Sometimes they are 
efficient, sometimes they are not,” he says.
What determines whether a market is efficient are 
factors like the degree to which information is available and
the frequency with which price discovery takes place. The
research on market efficiency has focused almost entirely on
stock and traditional bond markets in which both of those









of investors. And the market for a home clears only once
every several years, Lo points out.
He suggests that engineers have a more constructive way
of thinking about efficiency. Engineers evaluate engines 
relative to the ideal of being 100 percent efficient in terms of
how much energy goes in for the output it produces. Of
course, an engine of 100 percent efficiency is an unattain-
able fantasy — just like the idea that markets can be
perfectly efficient. “I think that is changing, slowly,” Lo says,
“but it will have to change a bit more before I think we have
a more complete view of market dynamics.”
Concerning the recent episode, maybe it’s who seemed to
be on the losing side of inflated asset prices that has intensi-
fied doubt over the EMH. Over the last couple of years it is
the “smart money” Lo refers to — the large, savvy investors
with lots of analytical tools at their disposal — that has
seemed to take the largest economic hits. Yet it is the smart
money that should have been able to identify and undo bub-
ble behavior. “That’s exactly why the efficient market
hypothesis has a bit of a black eye. It’s because what was 
supposed to have been the smart money ended up losing
tremendous amounts of money over the course of the last
couple of years. So it really calls into question the whole
premise of efficiency,” Lo says.
The Price is Right, Except When It Isn’t
The stakes in this debate reach beyond academic dispute. 
If economists can find a way to identify and measure asset
bubbles in real time, then they might be able to prick them
before excessive damage is done.
The bursting of an asset bubble can be costly, as we have
seen, but pricking a bubble before it inflates too high — for
example, by the Fed raising interest rates — may bring about
recession. Policymakers who are deciding whether to act
must gauge whether the costs of a potential recession are
greater than the costs of a potential asset bubble bursting.
This gamble is highly uncertain, largely because policy-
makers would have to identify a bubble in real time and also
gauge by how much prices are overinflated. Yet, if profit-
motivated market participants can’t gauge when an asset
bubble is occurring, should policymakers be able to do any
better?
According to some EMH critics, policymakers and finan-
cial market participants didn’t give enough credence to the
possibility that markets had gotten prices wrong. “Some
economists took the fact that prices were unpredictable to
infer that prices were in fact ‘right,’” wrote behaviorial 
economist Richard Thaler of the University of Chicago in
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 the Financial Times in August 2009. As early as 1984, Shiller
wrote that conflating the EMH with the idea that prices are
right has been “one of the most remarkable errors in the 
history of economic thought.” 
Under this view, the run-up in housing prices was dis-
missed by investors and policymakers alike with the efficient
market rationale that markets have greater wisdom than
individuals. Furthermore, critics claim the idea that markets
always get things right may have pervaded the very aspects
of modern finance that typically serve to dissuade excessive
risk-taking, from abiding by generally accepted accounting
standards to a casual approach to risk management. 
Justin Fox, economics and business writer for Time maga-
zine, thinks the EMH gradually evolved into the erroneous
view that markets should not be questioned. According to
Fox, there was a line of people believing that market-estab-
lished prices literally are correct, and advocating that stance
broadly. “That permeated the teaching of finance in business
schools and in economics departments and elsewhere for a
couple of decades,” according to Fox. He describes how he
believes this evolution took place in his 2009 book, The
Myth of the Rational Market. 
In Fox’s view, this interpretation of the EMH engendered
a complacent view of asset bubbles. Under the EMH “you
basically don’t believe in bubbles. When a bubble is going
on, you instead try to come up with all these rationalizations
for why prices must be that high, because they must be that
high for a reason.” In his experience observing the financial
community, he believes there has been a natural tendency
when markets are doing well for a long period of time for
market participants to start believing in what prices are 
saying, rather than any other signals they are getting.
“Anybody out there who’s saying, ‘This is crazy, prices of
houses or tech stocks aren’t worth this much,’ is made to
look stupid for year after year as the bubble grows,” he says.
“Some elements of the EMH offered a theoretical basis for
believing those things.”
But, according to Fama, the EMH does not preclude
market mistakes. If the bubble can’t be easily pinpointed,
that actually reinforces the EMH. “Bubbles are 20/20 
hindsight, basically. In my opinion, a bubble means that you
could predict when it’s going to break. I don’t think that 
was the situation,” he says. Indeed, many investors con-
vinced that they had identified the end of the tech and
housing bubbles lost a great deal of money prematurely 
trying to short-sell (placing a bet on a decline) in those 
markets — and many, of course, remained optimistic and
stayed in past their peaks. 
Similarly, for policymakers it is not enough to know
whether a bubble exists. Policymakers must also decide by
how much prices are inflated, the likely magnitude of the
potential fallout, whether the tools they have in their arsenal
would be effective in reducing the bubble, and whether
pricking the bubble could cause the very economic contrac-
tion they are trying to avoid. These questions rely on far
more judgment than just whether prices are providing an
accurate signal of an asset market’s true value.
Market Mistakes vs. Market Failures
Also lurking behind discussions of the validity of the EMH
seems to be a latent debate over the desirability of relying on
markets in general. When prices aren’t “right,” they could
provide misguided signals and may therefore prevent capital
from being allocated to its best uses. This idea caused John
Maynard Keynes to complain that the capitalist system
leaves the country’s investments in the hands of a “casino.”
Few would advocate that markets be dissolved in favor of
government-managed capital allocation, but those who view
markets as a predominant source of harmful economic 
fluctuations might advocate a stronger role for policy in
managing them.
For regulation to strike the right balance, policymakers
must understand the difference between market mistakes
and market failures. Market mistakes can be costly, as we
have seen, but trying to avoid them might be a poor goal for
policymakers. If such mistakes are indeed unpredictable, 
it would be difficult or impossible to form policy based on
avoiding them. Market mistakes also are hard to identify 
in real time with enough certainty to thwart them.
Intervening even when there is pretty good reason to believe
things are out of hand is still exceptionally risky, which is
why Fed policymakers have been hesitant to do it (although
some Fed policymakers have proposed revisiting that stance
in light of the fallout from the housing decline). 
Market failures, on the other hand, involve some funda-
mental flaw in market functioning that policy might be able
to improve. It is not obvious that the crisis reflected a funda-
mental market failure. It could instead have reflected a
failure of regulation, for instance. A discussion about the
validity of markets should include recognition that policy
and regulation can play a role in the functioning of free 
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Hoffer says, yet “there was not one word about credit 
problems during Cash for Clunkers.” This may imply CARS
participants had good credit, large down payments, or both. 
All are consistent with a higher income population.
Richmond, Va.-based CarMax lobbied Congress unsuc-
cessfully to include used cars in the program. Had the
program included used cars, it might have benefited the less-
wealthy, who tend to be more active in the used-car market,
Hoffer says. “It would have been more income-neutral.”
Environmental benefits were a selling point for the pro-
gram too. But they’re not as straightforward as they appear.
Many vehicles scrapped under the clunkers plan would have
gone into the used-car market, so CARS removed older pol-
luting cars from the road. All else equal, this should have
reduced emissions. CARS participants enjoyed a 9.2 MPG
increase in fuel efficiency, on average. This will certainly 
be a direct benefit to drivers of those cars: Consumer Reports 
estimates that will save owners $720 apiece in annual fuel costs.
But scrapping the clunkers produces carbon, as do new
car production processes. Perhaps more important, many of
the clunkers likely were driven less than the new replace-
ments will be. These owners now have more comfortable
fuel-efficient cars that are cheaper to drive and thus likely to
be driven more. This will eat into emission savings. Hoffer
believes it could even produce more emissions for a number
of cars, not less. The bottom line is that assessing the envi-
ronmental benefits of CARS requires looking deeper 
than just the car-for-car improvement in fuel efficiency.
Jaws of Life for the Auto Industry
Like any economic stimulus, CARS is likely to be more
effective when there are idle economic resources, a descrip-
tion that certainly matched the economy in 2009. But it
matters why resources are idle. By most accounts, the auto
industry has faltered because its products are not highly val-
ued relative to competitors. The program may have
provided only a temporary reprieve to an industry facing a
long-term structural decline. And since two of the Detroit
Three were effectively closed for the summer, when the
vehicles started selling, they couldn’t take advantage of the
sales momentum, Hoffer notes.
Moreover, the program used valuable economic
resources to replace still-functioning cars. Destroying those
productive assets represents a loss of welfare to society.
That’s why a true estimate of the program’s net benefits
must also subtract the value of the destroyed assets.
It is not easy to quantify this welfare loss. One could even
argue that the cost is small, since the program affects a small
number of cars relative to the total number on the road. But
more important, if policy broadly used artificially low prices
to affect individual decisionmaking in an attempt to subsi-
dize industries precisely because they are not highly valued,
then the distortions and unintended consequences could
produce losses that may overwhelm the gains. RF
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markets and the forming of investor expectations in both 
positive and negative ways. Regulations like disclosure laws 
can help markets become more efficient by making informa-
tion widely available. But a too-large public safety net that 
convinces market participants they will not have to 
bear all or most investment losses can induce investors to
rationally take risks they otherwise would not have.
Financial market participants may have taken market effi-
ciency for granted, as Fox believes. The only scenario that
would be at odds with what the EMH really says would be one
in which information had been accessible and market partici-
pants just didn’t use it. Yet the vast majority of economists,
policymakers, and financial market participants did not see
the financial crisis coming, perhaps indicating that such infor-
mation about the true risk was not there for the taking. Or
perhaps parties who ignored information about the risks were
rationally responding to perverse incentives to do so. 
Economists don’t yet fully understand all the factors 
that might cause markets to occasionally get prices wrong. 
To explain this, you can favor behavioral theories on 
psychology and investor biases, errors of regulation, or 
perhaps just a pervasive difficulty of accessing information
due to characteristics of the market in question. But none of
these explanations are inherently at odds with the EMH.
Studying the financial crisis with the benefit of hindsight
will help economists, investors, and policymakers better
understand the causes behind fluctuations in asset prices for
which there is no easy explanation. RF